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After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime suppressed the Ti-
ananmen Square protests in 1989, there emerged two starkly contrasting 
views regarding China’s future. One held that the horrific methods the 
government had used in cracking down would wreck public confidence 
in the regime and split the CCP, probably causing it to fall swiftly from 
power. The other view asserted that 1989 and the purges that followed it 
had so completely flattened the opposition that the forces of contention 
in Chinese society would never rise again. 
The truth lay somewhere in between. The CCP would not split or 
collapse, and indeed came out of 1989 in a strong position, having dealt 
oppositionists a massive setback. Not only had the protesters been put 
down, but the rapid sustained growth that began with the economic open-
ing of 1992 gave the authoritarian regime a cushion as people focused 
on material gain rather than politics and the CCP drew more profession-
als, intellectuals, businesspeople, and other elites into its ranks. Eco-
nomic growth, moreover, gave the party-state more resources to spend 
on both welfare and its many agencies of social surveillance and control. 
In these ways, the CCP displayed itself as a model of what Andrew J. 
Nathan has called “authoritarian resilience.”1 
Yet the opposition, however far down it may have been pushed by 
the weight of repression, never allowed itself to be fully quelled. In 
1998, within a decade of Tiananmen, prodemocracy activists would try 
to form a party. The regime crushed them in short order, but within two 
years dissident intellectuals began giving protest a voice by means of 
online petitions. These efforts scored their most famous achievement in 
December 2008, when Charter 08 (www.charter08.com) was released. 
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After the arrest of its leading sponsor, literary critic and later Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, more people joined. So the opposition 
is far from dead, even if it remains weak.
At the same time, what the regime calls “mass incidents” have been 
on the rise. Well-known episodes include the 2008 riots over police mis-
conduct in Weng’an; the unrest that followed the exposure of CCP cor-
ruption in Shishou in 2009; and a months-long protest of vote-rigging, 
local corruption, and land seizures in Wukan during 2011 and 2012. 
These cases show that the hold the authorities’ have on society is not 
as strong as is often thought. Public demonstrations with unmistakably 
political overtones have also drawn wide attention. These have included 
the successful 2007 protests against the building of a chemical plant 
in Xiamen; the 2009 rallies against a proposed waste-burning plant in 
Guangzhou; demonstrations aimed at Peking University psychologist 
Sun Dongdong for his support of the notion that people who petition 
officials are usually mentally ill and may merit detention; and gather-
ings outside courthouses during high-profile trials of figures such as 
Liu Xiaobo, the muckraking social activist Tan Zuoren, tainted-milk 
whistleblower Zhao Lianhai, and three Fujian Province “netizens” who 
had posted online evidence that police had raped and murdered a young 
girl. Additionally, small-scale and limited acts of “ordinary resistance” 
have been on the upswing since the 1990s,2 as have land disputes and 
protests against forced demolitions.3 
Examples such as these suggest that, despite the appearance of tight 
regime control, the forces of contention are alive and well more than 
two decades after Tiananmen. Although no dissident political move-
ment capable of openly defying state repression has so far appeared, it 
seems fair to say that the regime’s ability to hold society down is grow-
ing weaker. 
The CCP has ruled China continuously since 1949 by maintaining 
conformity within its own ranks, staying in charge of key resources, ab-
sorbing nascent elites, and efficiently controlling society. The Tianan-
men protests of 1989 had been set in train eleven years earlier, when 
China emerged from two years of turbulence following the 1976 death 
of Mao Zedong. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping began a shift from a holistic 
ideology of total control to a more relaxed stance meant to foster eco-
nomic growth and social development. Although conditions were still 
far from ideal, civil society began to flourish and to cultivate the capac-
ity for protest and opposition that eventually materialized in Beijing’s 
Tiananmen Square at the end of the 1980s. 
As bloody and thorough as the 1989 crackdown was, it did not com-
pletely reverse the process of social opening that the party-state had ini-
tiated. Deng’s famous tour of southern China in 1992 marked the post-
Tiananmen CCP’s return to the course that the Party had set back in the 
1980s of trying to blend increased openness with continued control. On 
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the one hand, the CCP still owned the key resources, actively absorbed 
rising credentialed elites, dominated (or tried to dominate) society, and 
revealed that it could adapt to new situations. On the other hand, wealth 
flowed into and from the private sector in ways that both required and 
allowed ever more people to leave behind their collective work units and 
communes. The new and more market-friendly economic arrangements 
spurred huge demands for mobile and technically skilled profession-
als and freelance workers. Their mode of living could no longer be the 
closely watched and even barracks-like existence that for decades had 
been associated with the PRC. The basic change has been this: The in-
dividual is no longer under the complete control of a state whose domi-
nance has been eroding in a least four ways: 
1) The coherence, ideological and otherwise, of the ruling elite 
is weakening. This elite can now be better described as a mix of in-
terests rather than a unity. The CCP now features within its ranks a 
variety of ideas and interests that would stun Chairman Mao. Some 
are simply expressions of localism. The PRC’s revenue-sharing sys-
tem, adopted in 1994, divides tax proceeds between the center and 
the provinces. This naturally gives the latter more leeway to make 
their own decisions on various matters—and at times to passively re-
ject unwelcome decisions coming from Beijing. Moreover, certain of 
the central government’s resource-management arms (including the 
agencies in charge of electricity, telecommunications, and petroleum) 
have effectively monopolized their sectors as state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and begun pursuing their own interests. Lastly, the party-state 
bureaucracy is no longer informed by Marxism, Maoism, or any other 
“-ism” except careerism. Corruption is widespread, and many officials 
focus on nothing but the acquisition of wealth and social status. Cer-
tainly few concern themselves with upholding the law or disinterest-
edly serving the public. 
2) The share of China’s economic and social resources under direct 
CCP control has been shrinking year by year since 1978. It is true that 
since 2003 the state—despite widespread criticism—has expanded at the 
expense of the private sector, but not by enough to reverse the overall 
trend. The CCP regime has long relied on economic performance to bol-
ster its legitimacy, but the SOEs, though richly supplied with resources, 
are all too often low-productivity operations that depend for survival on 
fiscal subsidies, massive loans from state banks, and monopolistic pric-
ing. They contribute little to the PRC’s bottom line, and indeed have 
forced a reliance on foreign and private capital to a degree that has cur-
tailed the state’s discretionary powers and even softened its iron fist. 
Then too, the state’s control of social resources may not match its control 
of economic resources. For instance, the China Statistical Yearbook for 
2008 notes that in 2007, SOEs controlled 44.8 percent of the national 
capital but employed only 21.8 percent of China’s urban population. 
29Zhenhua Su, Hui Zhao, and Jingkai He
3) The CCP is losing its capacity to absorb rising new social elites. 
The CCP cannot survive as China’s sole ruling force unless it brings 
newly important social groups (such as educated professionals) into its 
ranks. Its main way of doing this has been to give people jobs. But that 
avenue is closing. The institutions that are under CCP control—party 
and state administrations, SOEs, and the bureaucracies that oversee cul-
ture, education, scientific research, and health services, for example—
are already overstaffed. Each year, very few fresh college graduates 
manage to become civil servants. Nor is this to say that everyone wants 
a job with the party-state: As the market-based economy has grown, 
more members of elite groups (especially if they are younger) have pre-
ferred to seek lucrative work in the private sector.
4) The CCP can no longer control society the way it used to. Prior 
to the 1978 reforms, the vast majority of China’s populace lived and 
worked under the direct control of communes, labor units, or village 
and neighborhood committees. Social control in that era relied heavily 
on decrees from the CCP leadership. As the old systems governing resi-
dence and employment have loosened, more people have slipped outside 
the orbit of direct Party control. In recent decades, hundreds of millions 
of China’s 1.2 billion citizens have left the permanent addresses under 
which they are registered in order to live and toil elsewhere. The party-
state’s watertight control of society has been a thing of the past since 
the late 1980s; the post-Tiananmen crackdown could not and did not 
restore it. 
The Limits of “Stability Maintenance”
In the organization-chart sense, social control in the PRC before 1978 
was the duty of law-enforcement agencies and other armed forces main-
tained by the state; various departments of government and the CCP (the 
Ministry of Culture, the Communist Party propaganda office, and so 
on); and mass organizations or committees for workers, women, young 
people, and neighborhood or village residents. But what really held it 
together was the party-state’s domination of politics, the economy, so-
ciety, and culture, along with a harsh household-registration system that 
segregated city and country dwellers and prevented citizens from mov-
ing around freely.
Deng’s reforms allowed society to make major gains vis-`a-vis the 
state, and have left only the skeleton of the classic social-control sys-
tem still standing. Social control currently, therefore, has gone from 
wholesale to retail: It is a matter of the CCP regime focusing special 
attention on particular individuals and organizations deemed threats 
to stability. The arms of the party-state dedicated to “stability mainte-
nance” (weiwen) aim to “nip all factors of instability in the bud.” This 
means controlling (if need be through police repression) the activities 
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of dissidents; helping local governments to “manage” (which some-
times means block) citizens’ petitions;4 and making sure that officials 
at all levels are held accountable for doing their part to maintain sta-
bility. 
Most stability-maintenance measures are taken after the fact, and 
consist, in effect, of punishments for various transgressions. Authori-
ties will at times take before-the-fact or “precautionary” measures if the 
need seems urgent, even though under the party-state’s own laws met-
ing out punishment for acts that have not yet been committed is clearly 
illegal. Advocates of the authoritarian-resilience thesis like to point out 
that since 1989 the regime has not shied away from using heavy-handed 
precautionary measures to enforce stability. Among its other problems, 
however, this whole effort is very expensive: In 2009, China spent al-
most as much on domestic-order maintenance as it did on military de-
fense.5 
The violent post-Tiananmen crackdown plunged China into a miasma 
of fear, and many people abandoned any idea of facing the regime in a 
posture of contention. Almost a quarter-century later, that paralyzing 
fear has faded. Today, no one under 24—or in other words, about 513 mil-
lion of China’s 1.3 billion people—has any memory of 1989. Ironically, 
the regime’s own efforts to stifle discussion of what happened during 
and shortly after that year—like its efforts to throw a veil of silence over 
its more recent crackdowns on movements such as Falun Gong—have 
helped to dispel fear by dispelling memory. Less memory means less 
fear, and less fear means more contention.
Another problem for the CCP regime is that precautionary enforce-
ment conflicts with the rule of law, which the regime has been trying 
to promote. In recent years, precautions against dissidents and petition 
groups have included violence, illegal searches and imprisonment, house 
arrest, stalking, and summoning for interrogations, often in blatant vio-
lation of current Chinese law. Such steps have been known to backfire, 
moreover, by rallying public sympathy to the side of their targets. The 
lack of underlying legal justification, meanwhile, has left security of-
ficials feeling so anxious that in many cases they do little more than go 
through the motions of bringing the state’s weight to bear against the 
forces of contention. The police nowadays, for instance, not uncommon-
ly “invite” activists whom they are watching to drop by headquarters to 
“drink tea”—a process meant to show that potential troublemakers have 
been noted, scrutinized, and warned by the state. Nowadays, many ne-
tizens enjoy posting online about their own “tea drinking” experiences, 
treating their receipt of such an “invitation” from authorities as an honor 
and a point of pride. Thus has a measure meant to intimidate become 
instead an incentive for activism. 
As the number of citizens engaging in contentions grows, even pun-
ishment is failing to achieve its anticipated effect. People know that pen-
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alties are mainly reserved for high-profile leaders such as Liu Xiaobo, 
Guo Feixiong, and Hu Jia.6 Followers face much less risk, and there are 
supportive social networks to assist those who do run seriously afoul 
of the authorities. Even more than “drinking tea,” being singled out for 
actual repression has become an honor and even a means to accumulate 
political capital, so more people are willing to chance it. 
Just two years after the government’s 2006 repression of hunger-
strike protesters came the even larger and more influential Charter 08 
movement. The regime sentenced its most famous member, Liu Xiaobo, 
to eleven years in jail, but the forces of contention showed no sign of 
stalling. In 2011 and early 2012, dozens of people tried to visit the blind 
lawyer and rights defender Chen Guangcheng (since exiled) during his 
house arrest in Shandong Province. All would-be visitors—including 
the actor Christian Bale, who made world news by filming himself being 
confronted by plainclothes security agents—met with official harass-
ment and in some cases physical attacks. No one actually got through 
the cordon to meet with Chen before he left China in May 2012, but 
people refused to be intimidated and kept trying. The whole episode 
underlines the limits of state repression and hence of the authoritarian-
resilience thesis.
But exposing the limits of what repression can do is not the same 
as forming an organized political opposition capable of systematically 
confronting the regime. What are the prospects that such an opposition 
will emerge?
New Society, New Forces
As one would expect given China’s status as a modernizing, urban-
izing country with a dynamic economy based on markets and strong in-
volvement in globalization, the country has become a place where con-
ditions favor the emergence of organized groups devoted to contending 
against an authoritarian state. The forces of contention are gathering and 
beginning to point themselves in the direction of political protest. The 
signs of the times are clear:
1) The public is gradually putting aside political apathy and fear. 
For a time after the repression of 1989 and the turn to markets and 
limited openness in the early 1990s, political indifference and a pre-
occupation with moneymaking prevailed throughout Chinese society. 
But in recent years, rights-consciousness has risen as citizens become 
increasingly discontented with the actions of an exploitative state, be 
they direct (forcible housing demolitions) or indirect (growing income 
inequality, rampant corruption, and environment pollution).7 People 
want to know how the government is affecting them, including wheth-
er it is effectively administering public services and honestly provid-
ing promised benefits. 
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The CCP’s own promotion of nationalist feelings has focused people 
on politics. Those born in the 1980s and 1990s have reached adulthood 
without memories of personal political trauma or a fearsome state bu-
reaucracy holding sway over them. 
2) There are now market-based media outlets to provide an alterna-
tive to the old state-run media. In the 1990s, the old wall of prohibi-
tion around news, commentary, and social communication in general 
began to crack. Once completely banned, media not run by the state now 
serve a more diverse society with a growing appetite for all things cul-
tural, recreational, and informational. Although censorship continues, 
profit-seeking “marketized media” organs (state-owned but not tightly 
state-run) increasingly adapt their content to the tastes, preferences, and 
values of the public. Opinion columnists and commentators often ex-
amine local officials, national policies, and various social phenomena 
with critical eyes. There is live television news and in-depth coverage 
of current issues, including matters that the authorities would prefer to 
see undiscussed. Burgeoning Internet use likewise spurs portions of the 
“marketized media”—staffed by people who do not identify with the 
institutions of the party-state but think of themselves as independent 
professionals—to grow bolder in presenting controversial viewpoints 
and reports. China’s “marketized media” outlets still belong to the state, 
but they nonetheless provide a more open platform for speech that de-
parts from the official line. Count them as another reason why the CCP 
regime has less control than it used to over what Chinese people are 
reading, thinking, and saying. 
3) The rule of law and the defense of rights are growing in pres-
tige and prominence. After 1978, the CCP’s market-friendly reforms 
led to the disintegration of the communes and the system of “official 
affiliations” that once placed most of the populace under direct state 
control. In the 1990s, hundreds of millions of migrating workers and 
businesspeople further cemented such change. Economic development 
has produced whole new social classes in the form of tens of millions 
of entrepreneurs, small-business owners, freelancers, and white-collar 
workers. The state’s original direct-control system could not keep up. 
The CCP regime has had little choice but to turn to the rule of law as one 
of its main methods for managing society and as a major supplement to 
authoritarian tactics. Thus promotion of law-based rule became official 
state policy in the late 1990s.
For the party-state, the strengthening of the rule of law is a two-
edged sword. It aids in the task of social control, but it also sets up 
protections for common people that the authorities are not used to wor-
rying about. In pursuit of rapid economic growth, the Chinese state 
often seizes key resources at below-market prices and suppresses 
stakeholder groups that might object. The ranks of the discontented 
are not small. They include laid-off SOE workers who receive scanty 
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one-time severance payments based on their seniority; peasants whose 
land is seized without adequate compensation; property owners ren-
dered homeless when the government flattens their houses to make 
way for a railway or a dam; and the like.8 Abuses of power by all levels 
of government, as well as the state’s repression of religious groups, 
have prompted large numbers of people to join the ranks of shangfang 
(petition and appeal) movements. In response to having their interests 
trampled, promised benefits taken away, and voices stifled, people 
have been turning to new methods of “rightful resistance,”9 making 
use of the current legal system as well as more traditional measures 
such as personal letters of petition. The new term weiquan (rights de-
fense) has grown out of this movement.10
The rights-defense movement expresses itself in the form of indi-
viduals’ appeals on behalf of their personal interests, but taken as a 
whole it involves impressive numbers of citizens who span various 
social classes and speak for a wide array of concerns. The move-
ment has not only given birth to a legal group dedicated to defending 
rights, but has turned ordinary people who were once concerned only 
with their own narrow interests into activists who will fight to defend 
rights more generally. Intellectuals, activists from nongovernmental 
organizations, and media types have also become involved. 
True, there is as yet no single unified rights-defense organization, 
but many weiquan “micro-ecologies” have germinated and are show-
ing potential. The typical rights-defense micro-ecology brings togeth-
er petitioners with lawyers (who often work for free), journalists, and 
NGO activists. Political dissidents can appear among petitioners, as 
can members of influential elites, whose presence is a particular boon 
to mobilization. In these loose groups, members reach consensus on 
values and typically do much of their communicating and mobiliz-
ing via interpersonal networks and the Internet. In recent years, the 
“gatherings” held to protest Sun Dongdong’s speeches or to draw at-
tention to the legal plight of the three Fujian Province netizens have 
displayed the micro-ecological systems’ growing capacity for orga-
nizing and mobilizing dissent.
4) Despite the CCP’s harsh control efforts, political dissidence en-
dures. The Tiananmen crackdown created a group of dissidents who 
have kept the flame burning for almost a quarter-century now. Some 
intellectuals have joined their ranks through self-reflection, as have oth-
ers who have found themselves on the wrong side of an abusive state 
and wish to see past injustices righted and future injustices prevented. 
The Internet has inspired people to become dissidents or at least to sym-
pathize with dissidents. Then there are those on the receiving end of the 
CCP’s religious persecution. All these dissidents lack identifiable orga-
nizations, but they make political claims. They keep in constant contact 
with one another and stay involved in public affairs and rights-defense 
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activities. When incidents occur, they issue public position statements. 
They make the case for reforms of various kinds and sponsor move-
ments such as Charter 08. Dissidents are not vast in number, but some 
can boast of elite credentials and some even possess charismatic leader-
ship qualities. Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize has brought them intense 
international interest and attention. The regime regards political dissi-
dents as the most formidable opposition force it faces, and has tightened 
its control by subjecting many active dissidents to special monitoring 
and inspection.
5) Second-generation migrant workers now form a more restive la-
bor force. Labor movements are not new in China. Ching Kwan Lee’s 
work on Chinese labor protest before 2000 suggests that the rise of labor 
movements is caused by worker resentment of state cadres, managers, 
and capitalists, and facilitated by new political and institutional spaces 
conducive to expressions of personal interests and resentment.11 Since 
2009, major strikes at Honda plants and a series of worker suicides at 
the massive Foxconn Electronics complex in Guangdong Province near 
Hong Kong have drawn considerable public scrutiny. 
The labor force—and with it labor activism—today is dominated 
by second-generation internal-migrant workers born in the 1980s and 
1990s. They have higher expectations regarding individual rights than 
their parents had. They work not only to feed their families, but to live 
fulfilling lives. They grew up in cities, but officially still count as rural 
residents and so often are left out of civic welfare programs and pension 
arrangements. They live at the harsh intersection where the conditions 
required for China’s continued rapid economic growth and global com-
petitiveness—ample amounts of low-paid, high-productivity labor—
meet dreams of a better life. The realities of long hours working for 
meager pay in difficult and even dangerous conditions will continually 
fuel the Chinese labor movement. The impetus for this movement is not 
political, but as stability-prizing local governments put heavy pressure 
on restive workers, the conflicts are turning from matters of employee 
versus employer to showdowns that pit workers squarely against the 
authoritarian CCP regime.
A Network of Contention Emerges
Under current authoritarian conditions, overt contentious activities 
remain scattered. But various contentious forces have managed to stay 
connected both online and on the ground, thereby establishing a conten-
tious network with explicitly political views. Within this network, con-
tention is no longer about the concerns merely of individuals or single 
groups, but draws on the extended network for support. Contemporary 
contention in Chinese society displays the following unique character-
istics:
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1) Coalitions are built via the Internet and interpersonal mobiliza-
tion. The Internet, introduced to the Chinese public in the late 1990s, 
now has more than 400 million Chinese users. It has multiplied oppor-
tunities for expression free of ex ante censorship, and has blunted the 
regime’s use of ostracism and social isolation against citizens deemed 
to be “dangerous.” The freedom of the online world has emboldened the 
“marketized media” to engage in freer reportage and comment as well. 
In the last ten years, the Internet has become the cutting-edge platform 
for news and information, the medium for the most incisive and auda-
cious speech, and also the most effective tool for mobilization. Since 
2009, the tools of choice for talking about and mobilizing contention 
have been Twitter and Sina Weibo (a microblogging service similar to 
Twitter), neither of which the state has so far been able to censor effec-
tively in real time. 
Political dissidents, rights defenders, and other social activists have 
been going online to communicate in real time since 2000, when politi-
cized online signature movements began to proliferate.12 Statements are 
drafted and spread online; anyone can sign, either directly or by sending 
information to managed emails for listing. The topics at first were par-
ticular incidents, but now all kinds of politically restricted subjects are 
raised. In 2004, an appeal for accountability in the matter of the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown drew more than a hundred intellectuals to affix 
their online signatures. Four years later came Charter 08, which drew 
thousands of signatures and made worldwide headlines, timed as it was 
to fall within the same year as the Beijing Olympics.
In China as elsewhere, many people communicate and become ac-
quainted online, and these interactions can have a political cast. Those 
active in the causes of dissent and organized contention like to bond, as 
the online acronym goes, IRL (“in real life”) as well, and do so through 
meals, seminars, lectures, and other weiguan (crowd gatherings). In 
April and August 2010, artist and activist Ai Weiwei hosted dinners 
in Hangzhou and Shanghai, respectively. The first drew nearly three-
hundred people and the second drew a thousand. More than half were 
petitioners. In 2009, activists from all over China organized “tours” of 
Hubei Province’s Badong County out of concern over possible state 
manipulation of a local murder case in which the victim was an offi-
cial. (With formal rallies and demonstrations normally banned, activists 
opted to go as tourists.) This was the first instance of a collective act of 
contention organized entirely by netizens. 
Anxious not to let the freedom of the Internet grow unchecked, the 
regime has adopted measures such as the infamous Great Firewall of 
China to prevent activists from accessing sensitive material that could 
be used to promote political and religious dissidence. Widely available 
proxy software, however, allows many to “climb over the wall” and 
view blocked content. Most Chinese netizens may not be actively cir-
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cumventing censorship on a regular basis, but they receive much freer 
access to expression and information online than has ever been possible 
before. The Internet has made the regime’s desire to control what its 
citizens may learn or say impossible to fulfill. 
Through their daily doings and online interactions, as well as through 
shared participation in specific rights-defense movements, contentious 
activists become well known to one another. Circles of acquaintance 
expand, groups grow, and collective actions become easier to mobilize 
through personal networks. Influential cases include the 16 April 2010 
gathering,13 the 16 June 2010 gathering,14 and the May 2009 seminar 
organized by nineteen intellectuals in memory of the twentieth anniver-
sary of the 4 June 1989 movement.
Study of the professional and regional backgrounds of Charter 08 
signatories reveals that people from many walks of life are willing to 
openly express their political opinions and bear the consequences. The 
signers came together through various interpersonal networks with clear 
and relatively similar political claims and identities—an indicator that a 
network of social contention is emerging to challenge authoritarianism 
in China.
2) The forces of contention are becoming less reactive and more 
proactive. Rapid economic growth and the rise of markets have brought 
increased income inequality. Many citizens feel exploited in both rela-
tive and absolute terms, and a growing number resent the government. 
The CCP has not been able to alleviate their discontent, and the resent-
ment grows seemingly unchecked. Flare-ups occur in the form of widely 
covered incidents such as the ones mentioned earlier that took place at 
Shishou, Weng’an, and Wukan. These protests involved many people 
whose personal interests were not directly at stake. They were involving 
themselves proactively by identifying with and supporting movements 
whose principles they affirmed.
3) A strong economy is not enough to stop contention from break-
ing out. The CCP regime has overseen some of the world’s most im-
pressive rates of economic growth during the past several decades, but 
none of that translates into political legitimacy.15 For one thing, even 
in the area of economics alone, the CCP must keep outdoing itself: No 
matter how rapidly growth occurs, people’s demands and expectations 
will outstrip it. Yet woe to the regime should economic progress stall: 
Discontent aimed directly at the government would quickly escalate un-
til it gave rise to a massive proactive contention that the forces of order 
would find themselves hard-pressed to contain.
4) Defense of economic rights leads to political contention. Con-
tentions focused on the defense of rights often begin when economic 
interests are violated, and generally aim to influence local govern-
ments. But when the petition route fails and appeals to the rule of law 
do not avail, rights defenders must change tactics and turn to the cause 
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of political reform if they wish to safeguard their economic rights. 
Meanwhile, proactive contentions making direct political claims are 
also growing under the influence of Charter 08 and the 16 April 2010 
gathering.
The authoritarian regime that rules China has nearly exhausted all 
the stability-maintenance measures at its command. The measures them-
selves are declining in effectiveness yet rising in cost. Collective con-
tentions continue to increase as the forces of contention coalesce. The 
government can manage small-scale social movements led by middle-
class urbanites, but beyond that it is mostly at sea and unable to adapt its 
response mechanisms to deal with large-scale contentions.
The Politics of Contention
We do not pretend to own a crystal ball and will venture no firm pre-
diction as to whether China is likely to become democratic or not. Yet 
we do propose that the key to understanding China’s near-term political 
future is to grasp the dynamic between the authoritarian state and civil 
society. The regime has been successful so far at using direct control 
to stunt the growth of opposition groups. Yet as the regime’s control 
weakens while emerging networks of contention become stronger, how 
will the dynamic evolve?
First and foremost, the state’s continuing will and ability to wield the 
stick of repression remain the most important factors. Activists can be 
(and have been) willing to stand against the regime’s punishments and 
deterrents, but the scale and intensity of repression matter. The recent 
upheavals in the Arab world have made the CCP highly alert to the 
danger of possible democratic diffusion effects. The security apparatus 
is more thoroughly institutionalized, and its organization and practices 
have been overhauled to improve coordination among its various de-
partments. Were the regime to opt for more selective and severe repres-
sive tools (as in some cases it already has), dissidents could face higher 
hurdles as they seek to organize contentions.
With adequate funds and an increasingly sophisticated network 
of security officials, China does not seem to suffer from any lack 
of means to enforce repression. Yet the regime’s resolve to repress 
may become complicated by the increasing political prominence of 
the security apparatus. In 2002, the CCP placed the PRC’s Ministry 
of Public Security (China’s national police) under a member of the 
CCP Politburo. One seat on the powerful Politburo Standing Com-
mittee had also been assigned to the national head of internal secu-
rity (the secretary of the CCP’s Central Commission for Political and 
Legal Affairs). At the local level, police chiefs have received higher 
administrative ranks and in many cases head the entire local security 
apparatus. 
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Has the increased political power that security cadres now enjoy, 
not to mention the concentration of so much authority in the hands 
of the police, made the “strongmen” the most potent force within the 
ruling party? The fall amid scan-
dal in 2012 of Bo Xilai, a powerful 
Politburo member from Chongqing 
whose trademark policy, or so he 
claimed, was using that city’s police 
force to fight organized crime, may 
hint that his fellow CCP higher-ups 
are now worried about keeping the 
state-security establishment under 
control. Before the opening of the 
Eighteenth Party Congress in early 
November 2012, most local govern-
ments rearranged their internal lines 
of authority so that senior judicial-branch officials (procurators-gen-
eral and court presidents) now stand on the same level as the police 
chief. 
In the newly formed CCP leadership, chosen at the Eighteenth Party 
Congress in November 2012, the rank of internal-security leader has 
been demoted to general Politburo-member status (instead of going to a 
member of the Politburo’s more elite Standing Committee). Moreover, 
the Central Party Secretariat, the political body in charge of coordinat-
ing CCP affairs, now includes no figure from the security sector. This 
should have the effect of making the security apparatus—placed as it 
now is under a larger array of decision makers—less arbitrary and less 
likely to launch bouts of violent repression. 
Last but not least, the emerging network of contention will play its 
own role, despite the state’s strong repressive machine. This network’s 
importance lies in its decentralization and “flatness.” The popularity of 
Sina Weibo has made it even easier for citizens to form contentious 
groups and otherwise spontaneously organize themselves. Leaders mat-
ter less since people no longer need political entrepreneurs to mobilize 
and connect them; the contention networks (whether online or inter-
personal) can do that. This means that the state will not be able to shut 
down contentious networks by striking at a handful of central figures. 
Ordinary members (in a sense, everyone in a flat network is an “ordi-
nary” member) will remain aware of and available for contentions, and 
arresting a few people will not change that. Without obvious targets for 
repression that it can single out, the security apparatus will be of less 
use. Or so it would seem, at any rate. The authoritarian regime that rules 
China has shown itself highly adaptable in the past, and perhaps its po-
lice officials will come up with new ways to adapt to the flat-network 
and speed-of-Twitter problems as well. 
When resilient authoritar-
ian state meets resilient 
contention network, who 
will rise most effectively to 
the challenge: a new party-
state leadership or an 
ever-evolving and dynamic 
Chinese society?
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The relationship between the CCP regime and China’s networks 
devoted to democratic contention will continue to be a high-powered 
standoff. The state apparatus is slipping a bit but still strong, while civil 
society groups have limited power but greater organizational flexibility 
and the will to make persistent political demands. When resilient au-
thoritarian state meets resilient contention network, who will rise most 
effectively to the challenge: a new party-state leadership or an ever-
evolving and dynamic Chinese society?
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